What did the Royals gain (and lose) in the Mike Moustakas trade?

The Royals were in the national news on Friday night, and it had nothing to do with their game against the Yankees (it was rained out; they have a doubleheader scheduled for today). Late last night, the Brewers and Royals pulled off a trade, with the Royals posting this on their Twitter:

The trade was expected by Royals fans ever since the season began, really. The Royals expected to sign elsewhere when he became a free agent at the conclusion of the 2017 season along with Lorenzo Cain and Eric Hosmer. However, while Hosmer and Cain signed with the Padres and Brewers, respectively, the market for Moustakas never materialized, and he ended up re-signing with the Royals while in Spring Training for a one-year, $5.5 million deal.

Moose re-signing ended up being a blessing in disguise for both the Royals and Moose. Moose is having another solid year (20 home runs, 107 wRC+), proving that 2017 wasn’t a fluke, and the Royals got to not only keep a fan favorite a little bit longer but also got something in return for his departure. In the end, though it came as a surprise in March, Moose coming back to Kansas City was a win-win for everyone.

So, what did the Royals gain and lose in the deal overall? Let’s take a look.


What the Royals gained in the Moose trade.

The Royals received two prospects in OF Brett Phillips and RHP Jorge Lopez, a pretty good haul considering how close the Royals were to the deadline. To give some context, the Brewers have a pretty deep farm system, as Baseball America ranked them 6th overall in their talent rankings going into 2018


Phillips is the crown jewel of the deal, as he was the 7th rated prospect in the Brewers system and the 80th best prospect in baseball overall by Baseball America going into the 2018 season. Phillips, however, was unable to break into a crowded Brewers outfield (which sports Lorenzo Cain and Christian Yelich this year), as he has only appeared in 52 games and accumulated 122 plate appearances the past two years in Milwaukee. This year has also been a little slow for Phillips in Triple-A, as Phillips is only posting a slash of .240/.331/.411 with an OPS of .742 and 6 home runs in 299 plate appearances in Colorado Springs. That being said, he has demonstrated success in Colorado Springs before, as he hit 19 home runs and posted an OPS of .944 in 432 plate appearances in 2017.

Patrick Brennan of Royals Farm Report had a pretty good write up on Phillips, and had this to say about the prospect on Twitter:

The other player acquired in the deal is Jorge Lopez, a reliever who has appeared in 10 games this season and has accumulated 19.2 IP and a 2.75 ERA and 1.48 whip this season. Lopez was drafted in the 2nd round in 2011 out of Puerto Rico and originally broke into the Brewers system as a starter. However, he transitioned to the bullpen last year, and so far the results have been mixed. While he has been decent with the big league club, he still struggles with command, as evidenced by 1.15 K/BB ration, and his ERA and WHIP numbers look worse in Triple-A as it was 5.65 and 1.50 respectively in 28.2 IP with Colorado Springs in 2018.

Ironically, much like Goodwin, I wrote a piece featuring Lopez prior to the 2011 MLB Draft. Here’s what I said about Lopez in the post:

“John Sickels has Lopez projected to go at the 49th slot in his latest mock supplemental first round draft. Lopez is a high-ceiling arm, with a nice frame and good stuff according to reports. While Puerto Rican prospects usually don’t have a history of going high in the draft (Luis Atilano was the highest pick from Puerto Rico in the history of the draft, as he went No. 35 in 2003), Lopez seems to be an exception to the rule.

According to a report by Perfect Game USA, Lopez is getting comparisons to Javier Vazquez. He still has a lot of room to develop as a pitcher (he’s six-foot-four inches, and 175 pounds), but already he sports a fastball that goes in the low 90’s and a good spinning curve ball that has gotten good reports from scouts. An excellent athlete (Lopez played volleyball, basketball and ran track in addition to baseball), Lopez used to be a shortstop before he converted to the mound full time.”

The shine of Lopez as a prospect has certainly faded a bit the past couple of seasons, as he was unranked in the Brewers system, a far cry from his days where he rated as the 59th best prospect overall by Baseball America going into 2016. However, Lopez should bring some much-needed depth to the Royals bullpen in the immediate future. It’s definitely possible he could develop into a solid setup man or perhaps a closer in the near future should the Royals part ways with Wily Peralta (also a former Brewers top pitching prospect).


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What did the Royals lose in the deal?

Obviously, the Royals lost Moustakas, which while expected, is still a tough pill to swallow for Royals fans. Moose was one of the first big prospects drafted by Dayton Moore, and from the day he was drafted, it was understood that the Royals’ future success would depend on him. Thankfully, he panned out and became a key cog for the Royals’ success from 2013-2017 along with Alex Gordon, Lorenzo Cain, and Eric Hosmer.

In 934 games and 3,735 plate appearances over eight seasons with the Royals, Moose hit 139 home runs and had a career OPS+ of 98. However, Moose really developed and hit his stride as a player in 2015, his first All-Star appearance. If you look at his numbers from 2015-2018, Moustakas hit 87 home runs and had an average OPS+ of 114.3 in the four-year span, and he did this despite missing most 2016 due to a knee injury (he only played in 27 games).

With Moustakas gone, the hole at third will most likely be filled by a rotating door of players, with Hunter Dozier and Rosell Herrera being the most logical options to fill in immediately.  This season, Dozier has an OPS+ of 61, and Herrera has an OPS+ of 77, both far cries from Moose’s 111 OPS+ as a Royal this year. It will be interesting to see how Ned Yost will manage the position and who will emerge as the more regular third baseman of the two. Dozier is a former first-round draft pick who has struggled with the bat since getting injured a year ago, and Herrera was a recent waiver wire pickup who used to be a top prospect in the Rockies system but has a tendency to be too free-swinging and lacks power. Both certainly have potential, but they both have a lot to do to make up for Moose’s production at the hot corner.

However, the biggest loss from the Moose trade definitely comes in the clubhouse, as Moose developed as a more vocal leader during the past four years. Royals MLB.com beat writer Jeff Flanagan shared this tweet today about Moose:

There was a lot of great things to remember about Moose: the diving catch in the stands in Game 3 of the 2014 ALCS, the Moose antlers at games and crossing signs, the resting bitch face he seemed to employ 24/7. However, what made Moose great was that he showed that the Royals could draft good players, develop them, and see them win with the Royals, not some other club. The Royals have had a penchant for drafting and developing guys, only to see them win with their next club. Johnny Damon, Jermaine Dye, Carlos Beltran, and Zach Greinke are just a few of the names who performed well with Royals initially, only to find more individual and team success with another club. Moose bucked that trend, and for a little bit, he showed that Dayton Moore wasn’t a complete jackass.

And Moose represented a lot of what Kansas City was about. He probably was the most relatable out of the Royals stars. He isn’t the happy go lucky guy like Salvy. He isn’t an incredible athlete like Cain. He isn’t a hunk like Hosmer. And he isn’t a local Midwest boy like Gordon. Moose is just…Moose, and I know I appreciated him for his no-nonsense, laid back personality.

And he was a Cali guy who embraced Kansas City, much like me. Maybe that’s another reason why I like him so much.

Anyways, Moose will be missed, both on and off the field. At least he will be back in the lineup with another former Royal in Cain. True Royals fans will appreciate seeing something familiar in October should the Brewers hold on and make the playoffs.

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Who did the Royals get in Brian Goodwin? (And why did they make this trade?)

The Kansas City Royals should be in “tank mode” (there’s t-shirts and everything). They sit in the bottom of the AL Central, and they are battling with the Baltimore Orioles for the worst record in baseball overall. Already the Orioles are starting to lean in fully to the “tanking” strategy, as evidenced by them trading superstar Manny Machado to the Los Angeles Dodgers for a gaggle of prospects. One would think the Royals would also be “all-in” on such a strategy, eager to follow the lead of the O’s in order to keep pace for the No. 1 draft pick in 2019.

However, it seems like the Royals, both on the field or in the front office won’t go down this season quietly.

Already the Royals are 3-0 in the second half thanks to a weekend series sweep of the Minnesota Twins at Kauffman. And if that wasn’t enough, general manager Dayton Moore made an aggressive move in the wake of Jeurys Familia being traded from the Mets to the Athletics:

The move by the Royals is an interesting play, as it somewhat contradicts the notion that the club is “tanking.” “Tanking” teams are giving up Major League players for Minor League prospects, not the other way around. Nonetheless, let’s take a look at who the Royals received in the trade, who they give up, and why they decided to trade for the 27-year-old outfielder.


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Who did the Royals receive?

Since Jorge Soler went down with a foot injury in June, the Royals outfield has lacked depth and effectiveness. While Alex Gordon has held down the left field position this season, and Jorge Bonifacio has added some stability after returning from suspension, it’s been a bit of a rotating door in center field. Abraham Almonte underwhelmed and eventually was released by the club. Rosell Herrera has flashed some promise from time to time, but it’s clear he’s not a long-term solution. Paulo Orlando is a far cry from what he was a few seasons ago, and Alcides Escobar may offer some athleticism and defense at the position but doesn’t hit well enough to justify him moving into the outfield.

Goodwin, on the other hand, is a pure outfielder who comes in with a lot of accolades over his Minor League career, though his star has faded a bit over the past couple of years. Goodwin is a former first-round pick who was drafted by the Washington Nationals 34th overall in 2011 (the same draft year as Bubba Starling). Immediately, Goodwin was praised for a strong tools set, which included plus-speed, a solid ability to make contact, and a mature batting eye for his age. Going into 2013, Baseball America ranked him as the 70th best prospect overall, and Jonathan Mayo of MLB.com ranked him as the 52nd best prospect overall.

Before, when I was writing on prospects at my Giants-centered Minor League site, Optioned to Fresno, I covered Goodwin leading into the draft. Here’s a snippet on Goodwin from that post written in 2011, where I quote a scouting report on Goodwin:

“He does a lot of little things well, and has four legitimate tools, lacking power as the only tool to make him the always coveted five-tool talent. And despite his lack of power, Goodwin will surprise you with his pop from time to time. Most of his power goes to the gaps, and his 6.5 speed allows him to leg out plenty of extra base hits. His bat is made for contact, as he excels at putting the ball in play and going with pitches to drive the ball up the middle and the other way. He is extremely fast out of the box, and gets down the line to first base as a left-handed hitter as well as anyone, allowing him to be a threat on infield grounders and bunt plays.”

Despite the praise and high expectations, things never went as planned for Goodwin in Washington. First, he was unable to find many opportunities in a crowded outfield that included Bryce Harper, Adam Eaton, Juan Soto, and Michael Taylor. Despite playing professional ball for seven seasons, Goodwin has only 144 games and 401 total plate appearances at the Major League level. With Soto and Eaton entrenched in the long term, and the Nationals most likely making a play for Harper this off-season, it just seemed like Goodwin was bound to be the odd man out in D.C.

Furthermore, while the Nationals’ outfield depth didn’t help, the 27-year-old outfielder didn’t do much to really sway management’s expectations on the field. In the minors, Goodwin has a career .253/.343/.399 slash with a .742 OPS and 53 home runs in 2,399 plate appearances in 565 total games. While those numbers aren’t bad by any means, they don’t “wow” or demonstrate that the Nationals were missing out on a lot. That being said, in Goodwin’s most extended stint in the majors in 2017, he actually impressed, and show glimpses of what he could do with regular playing time.

Filling in for an injured Adam Eaton, Goodwin hit 13 home runs and posted an OPS of .811 in 278 plate appearances in 74 games in 2017. While the average wasn’t great (.251), he made up for it with impressive power, as evidenced by a .498 slugging and .247 ISO last season. It’s easy to see why he was such a heralded prospect in the past when you check out his highlights from 2016 and 2017 in the video below:

Unfortunately, despite the promising extended look last year, Goodwin didn’t get much consistent playing time this year, as he filled in mostly as a pinch hitter with the big league club. He only has appeared in 48 games and has only 79 plate appearances, not much of a sample. And in that small sample, he only hit .200 with a .674 OPS and three home runs.

Goodwin will get a lot of starts and at-bats in the center field position this year, as he will be an upgrade over more free-swinging options such as Herrera, Orlando or even Escobar. The former supplemental-round pick demonstrates a patient approach, as evidenced by a 12.7 percent walk rate this year, and a 36.3 percent swing rate (it was 41 percent last year). To be more effective, he will need to improve his strikeout numbers, as he is striking out in 32.7 percent of his at-bat this year and posted a 24.8 percent K rate a season ago. That being said, considering this club’s problems with free-swinging out of the strike zone, Goodwin’s approach (he has only swung at 22.4 percent of pitches outside the strike zone this year) may be a nice change of pace for this Royals lineup.

Another question will be how Goodwin adapts in the outfield along with Bonifacio and Gordon, who both have their issues defensively. In the outfield, Goodwin was rated as 5.4 runs below average defensively last season in his extended stint, and the fans scouting report from last year wasn’t too glowing either. While Goodwin will have his shot for playing time in the second half, his defense may be the difference in terms of him getting regular playing time, or simply being a fourth outfielder in Kansas City.


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Who did the Royals lose?

The Royals traded relief pitcher Jacob Condra-Bogan, a 32nd round pick in the 2017 MLB Draft who came from Georgia Southern (He was drafted originally by the Toronto Blue Jays). By no means is Condra-Bogan an elite prospect, as he is currently 23-years-old and playing in Lexington (where he is 1.1 years older than the average prospect). But, Condra-Bogan has demonstrated good command in his first full big league season, as evidenced by a 2.08 ERA, 0.77 WHIP, and 39 strikeouts in 26 innings with the Legends.

Condra-Bogan has an interesting backstory, as Maria Torres of the Kansas City star profiled him on June 1st. It’s definitely worth reading if you want to get to know more about the 23-year-old, who bounced around the foster care system growing up. However, while Condra-Bogan definitely is a feel-good player worth rooting for, he didn’t have much of a prospect ceiling as an older, relief-only arm. So it’s not a huge loss overall for the Royals farm system. Nonetheless, Condra-Bogan has his share of fans, as evidenced by the Tweet below:

 


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Why did the Royals make this trade?

I found this Tweet pretty interesting from Down Under Fan (@RoyalDUF), who would have preferred the Royals go with some internal options in Omaha rather than acquiring the Nationals castoff.

In many ways, I empathize with RoyalDUF. The Royals plan ideally should be to rebuild the system by acquiring prospects and finding which players in the system currently are worth keeping and which ones aren’t. That’s not going to happen if players are still playing in Omaha or Northwest Arkansas. Maybe Schwindel or O’Hearn are Four-A players, but the Royals won’t know that unless they get at-bats against MLB players. Acquiring Goodwin definitely impedes that process from happening.

That being said, Goodwin is a low-risk acquisition who has potential to develop with regular playing time in the outfield. After all, he was a former first-round pick, was a highly rated prospect at one point, and has demonstrated that he can produce at the Major League level, as he did last season in Washington. While Condra-Bogan was a nice arm in the system, he was an older prospect in Single-A whose upside was a middle innings relief arm, maybe a setup guy at best. The Royals didn’t have to give up much for Goodwin, so that’s a win for Moore and the Royals organization.

It will be interesting to see too if this is the first of many moves for Moore as we approach the trade deadline. It seems like it’s only a matter of time before Mike Moustakas is gone, and it also seems to be plausible that Whit Merrifield and/or Lucas Duda may be dealt as well (especially Duda, who’s been on a tear in the last couple of games). Thus, the Goodwin trade may be a sign of Moore being proactive, as Goodwin could provide the Royals with some insurance in the lineup once the roster becomes thinner and younger perhaps in the next few weeks.

It’s the end of an era for Baltimore (and Kansas City too) after the Machado trade

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After hanging out at the All-Star game, Manny Machado (left) and Matt Kemp will be teammates in the 2nd half of the 2018 season. (Photo Credit: USA Today)

Manny Machado is one of my favorite players in baseball, not easy to do since commissioner Rob Manfred feels some MLB’s stars don’t “engage enough” to be marketable. (To be fair to Manfred though, Mike Trout can be as engaging as Colton Underwood from this season’s “Bachelorette.”) That being said, most of my affection for Machado stems from having him on my fantasy team for almost seven years now. I was able to acquire Manny Machado in my fantasy league off of waivers when he debuted for the Orioles in August of 2012. The rush for him from other league owners was insane, as nearly every team in the league put in a waiver bid for him. It made sense. He was not only the top prospect in the Orioles system, but he was considered one of the top prospects in baseball at the time, some characterizing him as the next Alex Rodriguez. Machado had the size (he stood six foot, three), the youth (he broke into the Majors not too long after his 20th birthday), the defense (many projected him as a perennial Gold Glove player; they weren’t wrong) and the rare combination of ability to hit for average and power that most middle infielders could only dream of.

I named my fantasy team “Machado, Machado Man” (a play on this famous song) in honor of him for a couple of seasons (before I eventually settled on my current name: “(Chien) Ming Dynasty“; a combo of the Ming Dynasty of China and Chien Ming Wang, a pitcher formerly of the Yankees). And for Orioles fans, baseball fans in general, and me as a fantasy owner, Machado hasn’t disappointed.

Over his seven seasons, Machado has accumulated a WAR of 30.9, has four All-Star Appearances, and two Gold Gloves to his name. He’s hit 162 home runs in his career thus far, an average of 31 dingers per season. And most importantly, he’s helped make the Baltimore Orioles relevant, no small feat considering they’re in a division with traditional MLB powers such as the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox.

After back to back ALCS appearances in 1996 and 1997 (which included young Yankees fan Jeffrey Maier interfering with play and robbing a home run at Yankees Stadium which supposedly turned the tide of the series), the Orioles fell into a tremendous rut of mediocrity that probably should’ve been profiled in some way on “The Wire“. The successful days of Mike Mussina and Armando Benitez on the mound, Cal Ripken in the infield, and Brady Anderson and Geronimo Berroa in the outfield became a ghost of the recent past, as the Orioles and the fans in Baltimore suffered through 14 consecutive losing seasons from 1998-2011. The Orioles became a roundhouse combo of lousiness: they overpaid for veterans who had no impact (Rafael Palmiero and Miguel Tejada), picked poorly in the draft (Wade Townsend, Billy Rowell, Matt Hobgood to name a few), and failed to have any stability in management, whether it was in the dugout or front office.

After drafting Machado in 2010 with the third overall pick, the Orioles fortunes began to change. Just two years after drafting Machado and hiring Buck Showalter as field manager and Dan Duquette as General Manager (both moves were criticized by experts around the league; as many felt they were retreads in baseball circles, failing with the Diamondbacks and Red Sox before, respectively), the O’s made the playoffs with a 93-69 record, which included a win in the AL Wild Card play-in game over the Rangers, and an exciting five games series with the rival Yankees (they lost 3-2). 2012 in many ways could be likened to the 2014 Kansas City playoff run in which the MLB team captured the attention and endearment of the city. Baltimore was no longer dominated just by the Ray Lewis and the Ravens. For a brief glimmer of time, Baltimore became a baseball town again, and Machado was front and center leading the charge.

For five more seasons, the Orioles remained competitive, making the playoffs two more times (2014 and 2016; they were ironically swept by the Royals in 2014, though Machado didn’t play that series due to injury), and only having one losing record in that time span (in 2017, where they went 75-87; most of that was credited to a late-season swoon where injuries hurt the club). As the Orioles became more competitive, Machado developed as a player. He didn’t quite maintain the defensive prowess he displayed early on in his first two seasons, but he did display a stronger power stroke, as he posted three straight seasons of 30+ home runs from 2015-2017. Debates in baseball circles fluttered about what position Machado really should’ve been playing. (Was he a shortstop or a third baseman?) However, as Machado entered his Age 25 and final season of club control, there was no debate that he was one of baseball most high-profile stars.

Orioles fans probably knew that the shoe of this competitive run was going to drop sooner or later. After all, it is Baltimore, where “The Gods will not save you.” Despite Machado being in the midst of one of his best offensive seasons yet (he has 24 home runs, a .963 OPS, and an OPS+ of 164), the Orioles have rekindled their early 2000’s selves (i.e. shitty), battling in the basement of the American League along with the Royals, both on pace for nearly 120 losses. (Such a far cry from their 2014 ALCS matchup, right?) With Machado going to command a big payday in the offseason, and a dire need to rebuild the farm system (the farm system has ranked below league average since 2014, according to Baseball Prospectus), Machado was finally traded, after weeks of rumors, to the defending NL Champs, the Los Angeles Dodgers, for an impressive haul of prospects.

It sucks. I grew up a San Francisco Giants fan living in Northern California, where hating the Dodgers came as natural as voting for a Democratic candidate in an election. To see Machado, one of my favorite players and the lynchpin of my fantasy baseball team for seven years (because I got him as a rookie keeper, he started off as a 20th round draft pick his first full year and has gone up one round every year since; yes, it’s the deal of the century) now wearing Dodger blue makes me sick. He should’ve been an Oriole for at least one more contract (like five-seven years). He should be up there with legends like Brooks Robinson and Ripken. Instead, he’ll just be another cog in the Dodgers long history of “irritating players of greatness,” while the Orioles and their fans have to suffer undoubtedly through another stretch of losing, hoping that another Machado will come around to save them sooner rather than later.

(To get a sense of the Orioles fan perspective, I embedded this link I found on Twitter. It was tough to watch this video below of Mallory Rubin of the Ringer say goodbye to Machado; it just goes to show you how rough it is for Orioles fans to be the black sheep of the AL East.)

And to make matters worse, Machado’s trade and the Orioles’ decline most likely is a sign of the lean years in store for Kansas City as well.


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First Machado (right, orange) left the Orioles; Is the Royals’ Mike Moustakas next?

 

Strangely enough, the Orioles and the Royals have been joined at the hip when it comes to their standing in Major League Baseball since the early 80’s. As the Orioles have risen to competitiveness in the 2010’s, the Royals have followed. The Orioles won a World Series in 1983. The Royals won two years later in 1985. The Orioles made the playoffs in 2012 after a 14-year absence. The Royals made the playoffs in 2014 after a 20-year absence. In their first playoff game after a lengthy absence, the Orioles won the Wild Card play-in game in dramatic fashion over an AL West foe (the Rangers). In their first playoff game after a lengthy absence, the Royals won the Wild Card play-in game in dramatic fashion over an AL West foe (the Athletics).

And of course, don’t forget the epic fight between the two clubs in 2016 which started with Machado and Royals pitcher Yordano “Ace” Ventura (RIP).

To further demonstrate the close Orioles-Royals connection in the 2010’s, baseball fans have to look no further to the 2010 MLB Draft. In what many people considered a three-player draft, the Orioles selected Machado with the third pick after Bryce Harper at 1 (to the Nationals) and Jameson Taillon at 2 (to the Pirates). Who had the fourth? No other than the Royals, who selected Christian Colon, a light-hitting, defense-first shortstop out of Cal State Fullerton. Unlike Harper or Machado, Colon has failed to stay in the Big Leagues, as he was waived by the Royals last season, and currently is in the minors in the New York Mets organization.

Strange how baseball works sometimes, huh?

In the coming days, much like the Orioles, the Royals will lose their third baseman (Mike Moustakas) for a bunch (fingers crossed) of prospects (though the haul won’t be as impressive as the Orioles’ package). And like Machado was the last major remnant of the Orioles’ competitive stretch, Moustakas leaving will also signify that somewhat as well. Instead of being side-by-side competing for an American League title like in 2014, it will instead be a battle for top draft picks on an annual basis, similar to what it was in the 2000’s for both clubs.

It will be different for Royals fans of course. The Orioles got a shot in the head with the Machado trade. It was obvious, high-profile, and expected. By June, Machado’s time in Baltimore was up, and thus, the club and fans have been in this rebuilding mindset for quite some time.

The process to the Royals’ rebuild, on the other hand, has instead been a slow one, not to mention painful. First James Shields…then Ben Zobrist…then Wade Davis…then Eric Hosmer and Lorenzo Cain…and soon to be Moustakas and maybe Salvador Perez, should the price be right (though the latter may not happen this year). For Royals fans, they would have definitely traded places with Orioles fans and their more publicized loss of their beloved superstar.

At least the pain and agony came all at once and they can move on quickly.

Unlike Orioles fans with Machado, Royals fans are still waiting for that final shoe to drop. And like most baseball moments over the past decade between the two clubs, it always comes a little bit slower for Kansas City than Baltimore.

 

 

What can the Royals do to avoid the most losses in franchise history? (Hint: They have 3 choices…)

The Kansas City Royals ended the “first half” of the 2018 season much like they started: by getting the crap kicked out of them by Chicago White Sox (and I say first half because technically it is beyond “half” numerically, but games before the All-Star Break are officially considered the first half, regardless of the number; confusing I know, but I didn’t create this obviously flawed system). As we enter the All-Star break, the Royals are 27-68 through 95 games, which makes them officially the worst team in baseball going into the Mid-Summer Classic (the Baltimore Orioles surpassed them after a 1-0 win over the Texas Rangers on July 15th, which put their record at 28-69). To make matters worse, not only is this Royals team one of the worst in baseball currently, but they could be the worst Royals team in the 50-year history of the club. (What a great way to celebrate such an anniversary, right?)

The team that currently holds the worst record in Royals history is the 2005 Royals, who went through three managers (Tony Pena, Jr., Bob Schaefer, and Buddy Bell) en route to a 56-106 record. Much like the 2018 Royals, the 2005 squad had just experienced some surprising success a couple of seasons prior. In 2003, the Royals won 83 games, their first winning record in over a decade at the time. (They previously had a winning season in 1993, thanks to the pitching of Kevin Appier. Yes, I know, it sounds weird in retrospect.) Unfortunately, the Royals were unable to build on the “feel good” campaign, fell back to earth in 2004, and went 58-104, the worst mark in franchise history at the time until they topped that loss mark by two games a year later. The horrid two-year stretch had a huge ripple effect throughout the organization, as not only did managers and rosters change dramatically from 2004 through 2005, but the club also parted ways with general manager Allard Baird, and replaced him with current general manager and former Atlanta Braves exec Dayton Moore on the last day of May of 2006.

For many Royals fans, the ghosts of 2004 and 2005 seemed to be a distant memory after such a period of success from 2013-2017. In the five-year stretch, the Royals won 80 games or more each season, made the playoffs and World Series twice (2014 and 2015), and added the second World Series championship in the club’s history to their mantle in 2015 (in addition to their one in 1985 where they beat I-70 rival St. Louis). Yes, the Royals were a small market club. Yes, they didn’t have the payroll of the Yankees, Cubs, Dodgers, or Red Sox. But, it was widely thought that the Royals had set a foundation for various levels of success for years to come.

Oh, how misguided and incorrect Royals fans were.

The poisonous brew of players leaving the club in free agency (Lorenzo Cain and Eric Hosmer), poor free agent signings (Ian Kennedy and Brandon Moss), and a lackluster farm system that had been gutted by mid-season trades (Sean Manaea going to Oakland in the Ben Zobrist Trade) and prospects failing to live up to expectations the past few seasons (Kyle Zimmer and Bubba Starling) has resulted in this season being the nightmare Royals fans were dreading at the conclusion of the 2017 campaign. Not only are the Royals the worst team in baseball now, but they are actually outpacing the 2005 club in losses at this point as well.

By the All-Star break in 2005, the Royals were 30-57 after 87 games (due to the season starting later than this year).

Yep, that’s right: the 2005 team was three wins better than the current Royals by this time of the season (and in 8 fewer games to boot). To make matters worse, for the Royals to tie that putrid 2005 squad, they have to to go 29-38 for the remainder of the season, which means they would have to win at least 43 percent of their remaining 67 games. To compare, in the first half, the Royals only won 28 percent of their 95 games.

To put it lightly, Kylie Jenner winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 would seem like an easier and more plausible task than the Royals tying or surpassing the 2005 Royals’ 56 wins. If the Royals duplicate their win percentage in the second half, they would only go 19-48, which would result in a record of 46-116. So, as you can see, the Royals would have to make up 10 games, just to even tie, which seems like an incredible feat, especially when one considers the trade deadline is July 31st. It is entirely possible there will be one to a few players on the current roster missing come August, hence making the team even weaker down the stretch.

So what should the Royals’ strategy be? What should Moore and manager Ned Yost due to avoid history and the moniker of “Worst Team in Royals History?” Here are a few “strategies” the Royals could take that might have an effect on their fortunes after the All-Star break.


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The Royals could keep playing veterans like Alcides Escobar, and hope they turn it around in the second half.

Strategy #1: Keep the Vets, Play to Win

It seems like a foregone conclusion that the Royals by the trade deadline are going to part ways with Mike Moustakas, and it seems highly likely that they will also part with Lucas Duda and/or Whit Merrifield to help give a contending team an offensive boost down the stretch. And it makes sense. The Royals are going nowhere, and they need to re-stock their farm system, which was ranked near the bottom in the Majors by nearly every publication of note. To trade some established stars for prospect depth at the deadline is a proven strategy that has worked for many clubs in years past (the Oakland A’s are masters of this approach).

But, teams these days value their prospects more than ever, and it is possible that the Royals may not get much in return for some of their current players. After all, Moustakas didn’t field much interest in free agency last off-season (hence him still being on the Royals), and while he’s having a solid season (19 home runs, 58 RBI, .250 average, and a .775 OPS), he has been overshadowed by Manny Machado when it comes to trade talks. Duda is a big bat, but he’s going through a down season at the plate and is a defensive liability, making him useless on a National League team. And while Merrifield offers position versatility and is a threat with the bat and on the basepaths, he won’t be a free agent until 2023, and he’ll be turning 30 next year, not an age where players of his skill set typically get better.

So with that being known, Moore may say “screw it” to all offers and just let it ride on the vets, and hope that they can stay healthy and turn around this season. The positive? Well, the Royals certainly would have a better chance to win with Merrifield and Moustakas and Duda in the lineup for the rest of the 2018 season as they have shown glimpses of success this year and in previous seasons. The negative? The veteran strategy would also employ vets such as Alcides Escobar, who has a negative-1.8 WAR, the worst mark on the team, as well as Kennedy and Jason Hammel in the rotation, who each have a 5.13 and 6.15 ERA, respectively.

Yost is a loyal, player-friendly manager, and if given the chance, he would trot Moustakas, Merrifield, Duda, and Escobar in the infield every day until the last game of the season, regardless of their performance. So the decision to employ or not employ this strategy would rest on Moore, who would need to trade at least one of these vets to take the lineup card out of Yost’s hands.


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Youngsters like Jorge Bonifacio (center) playing with veterans like Whit Merrifield (left) and Mike Moustakas could be a recipe for success.

Strategy #2: Play the youngsters, but in the right spots

We’re starting to see this strategy a bit in July, as Yost has started to depend on Adalberto Mondesi at SS rather than Escobar. (Though I do not get why he’s playing Escobar out of position in the outfield; he’s the worst hitter on the team…why is he continuing to play?) He’s also been giving Hunter Dozier, and Jorge Bonifacio at-bats as well, a sign that the organization wants to start seeing which “prospects” will have a future with the big league club, and which ones will be traded or triple-A fodder in the next couple of years.

But, going all out on the youngsters carries some risk. Some of the young players have responded, such as Mondesi, who has finished the first half with a .714 OPS. Some still leave a lot to be desired, like Dozier, who was touted as a strong-hitting, corner infielder, but is only hitting .211 with a .604 OPS and has negative-1.0 WAR, the second-worst mark on the team. So, it would be wise to balance out lineups with young guns and veterans on a day to day or series to series basis.

Want to start Mondesi, Dozier, and perhaps Cheslor Cuthbert, when he comes back from the DL (or perhaps Nicky Lopez, who may get called up from Omaha soon), in the infield? Well, make sure Merrifield is in the lineup to stabilize things. The same strategy applies to the outfield. Going with Bonifacio and Rosell Herrera? Then Gordo will be the left fielder to provide veteran mentorship to the lineup as well as in the field. The same works in the rotation, as Danny Duffy could be a veteran mentor for young starters like Brad Keller and Trevor Oaks (who should get called up again sometime in the second half).

The strategy carries a little more risk, since many of the young players on this roster are pretty unproven, and as stated before, they come from a system that isn’t highly regarded by any means. That being said, these lineups offer a little more upside than a “veteran only” strategy, and could also provide some hope for the future for Royals fans.


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The Royals could go all in on their prospects at the big league level, like Adalberto Mondesi at SS.

Strategy #3: Go all in on youth…regardless of the result

The Royals could do the equivalent of the “blow it up” NBA model. Moore and Yost could say “You know what? Screw the veterans! Who cares if they won us a title in 2015! Let’s rebuild now!” Escobar? Now a benchwarmer. Duda and Gordon? Spot starters. Hell, even give Salvador Perez a couple of days more off than usual so we can see what Cam Gallagher can do.

The strategy works in two ways:

  1. The young players get at-bats and experience, and if there’s anything that makes a younger player better at the Major League level, it’s more at-bats and experience. (It’s just common sense, but it’s amazing how some fans don’t understand this basic concept of “more experience = better development; less experience = less development.”)
  2. And if the young players suck, well, the Royals get a high first-round pick, and they know for sure who to build around for the future, and who not to sooner rather than later. When employing strategy #2, the problem is teams can get hung up on players longer than they want because the player is not getting enough at-bats to make a definitive decision. However, if you give 400-500 at-bats to a young player in a season, and he is clearly bad, well…it’s easier to cut ties because that is a pretty large sample size.

So there are some strong benefits to the “go young and let it ride” approach. Nonetheless, it’s a strategy that also carries a ton of risk (definitely the most of the three) and could alienate the fanbase more than the box office would like (i.e. it could kill ticket sales; the Royals still rank 11 out of 15 in the AL in attendance, which is a lot better than the 2005 squad). While the Royals need to rebuild and start looking to the future, the typical Royals fan wants to see faces he or she remembers from the 2015 team. So that means seeing Gordo, and Salvy, and Escobar for better or worse. Maybe they’re not the same players they were three seasons ago, but at least seeing their faces brings up good memories and nostalgia over copious amounts of Miller Lite in the bleacher seats.

And fans buying more Miller Lite is good for business at Kauffman stadium.


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Manager Ned Yost will have to make some interesting decisions to help turn around this club in the second half.

What strategy is the best for the Royals?

Personally, from an economic standpoint, number two is obviously the most logical. There are some players worth playing and keeping on this roster. Gordon deserves to play as long as he wants as a Royal (he’s earned it by helping them win a title and has been loyal to the organization through thick and thin), and Merrifield is a gritty player who provides a spark to this club and probably wouldn’t get what he’s worth on the trade market. But, there are a lot of veterans who need to go. As unexpectedly great as Moustakas has been this year, his value will never be higher, and the Royals need to get something in return to help stock their Royals system (after all, they received three prospects for Kelvin Herrera; I’m sure the Royals can get more for Moose). Escobar’s defense and timely hitting was appreciated in the 2014 and 2015 playoff runs, but his time as a serviceable MLB player is up and Mondesi deserves his shot. And while Duda brings a veteran bat to the lineup, I would rather see Dozier get a full shot at the position to see if he can be a big-league player, or if he’s simply a “four-A” prospect.

Overall, it’s likely the Royals will probably employ an overall #2 strategy as well. (I mean, really, how could you not? It’s the most practical strategy.) But the big question will be this: Will Moore and Yost’s strategy be closer to #1 or closer to #3? Will they still be loyal to the vets? Or will they ride their fortunes a little more on the young guns, with “low-key” hopes to secure the No. 1 pick if those youngsters don’t pan out?

I think Royals fans will have a good idea of their choice in strategy come August 1st.