Who did the Royals get in Brian Goodwin? (And why did they make this trade?)

The Kansas City Royals should be in “tank mode” (there’s t-shirts and everything). They sit in the bottom of the AL Central, and they are battling with the Baltimore Orioles for the worst record in baseball overall. Already the Orioles are starting to lean in fully to the “tanking” strategy, as evidenced by them trading superstar Manny Machado to the Los Angeles Dodgers for a gaggle of prospects. One would think the Royals would also be “all-in” on such a strategy, eager to follow the lead of the O’s in order to keep pace for the No. 1 draft pick in 2019.

However, it seems like the Royals, both on the field or in the front office won’t go down this season quietly.

Already the Royals are 3-0 in the second half thanks to a weekend series sweep of the Minnesota Twins at Kauffman. And if that wasn’t enough, general manager Dayton Moore made an aggressive move in the wake of Jeurys Familia being traded from the Mets to the Athletics:

The move by the Royals is an interesting play, as it somewhat contradicts the notion that the club is “tanking.” “Tanking” teams are giving up Major League players for Minor League prospects, not the other way around. Nonetheless, let’s take a look at who the Royals received in the trade, who they give up, and why they decided to trade for the 27-year-old outfielder.


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Who did the Royals receive?

Since Jorge Soler went down with a foot injury in June, the Royals outfield has lacked depth and effectiveness. While Alex Gordon has held down the left field position this season, and Jorge Bonifacio has added some stability after returning from suspension, it’s been a bit of a rotating door in center field. Abraham Almonte underwhelmed and eventually was released by the club. Rosell Herrera has flashed some promise from time to time, but it’s clear he’s not a long-term solution. Paulo Orlando is a far cry from what he was a few seasons ago, and Alcides Escobar may offer some athleticism and defense at the position but doesn’t hit well enough to justify him moving into the outfield.

Goodwin, on the other hand, is a pure outfielder who comes in with a lot of accolades over his Minor League career, though his star has faded a bit over the past couple of years. Goodwin is a former first-round pick who was drafted by the Washington Nationals 34th overall in 2011 (the same draft year as Bubba Starling). Immediately, Goodwin was praised for a strong tools set, which included plus-speed, a solid ability to make contact, and a mature batting eye for his age. Going into 2013, Baseball America ranked him as the 70th best prospect overall, and Jonathan Mayo of MLB.com ranked him as the 52nd best prospect overall.

Before, when I was writing on prospects at my Giants-centered Minor League site, Optioned to Fresno, I covered Goodwin leading into the draft. Here’s a snippet on Goodwin from that post written in 2011, where I quote a scouting report on Goodwin:

“He does a lot of little things well, and has four legitimate tools, lacking power as the only tool to make him the always coveted five-tool talent. And despite his lack of power, Goodwin will surprise you with his pop from time to time. Most of his power goes to the gaps, and his 6.5 speed allows him to leg out plenty of extra base hits. His bat is made for contact, as he excels at putting the ball in play and going with pitches to drive the ball up the middle and the other way. He is extremely fast out of the box, and gets down the line to first base as a left-handed hitter as well as anyone, allowing him to be a threat on infield grounders and bunt plays.”

Despite the praise and high expectations, things never went as planned for Goodwin in Washington. First, he was unable to find many opportunities in a crowded outfield that included Bryce Harper, Adam Eaton, Juan Soto, and Michael Taylor. Despite playing professional ball for seven seasons, Goodwin has only 144 games and 401 total plate appearances at the Major League level. With Soto and Eaton entrenched in the long term, and the Nationals most likely making a play for Harper this off-season, it just seemed like Goodwin was bound to be the odd man out in D.C.

Furthermore, while the Nationals’ outfield depth didn’t help, the 27-year-old outfielder didn’t do much to really sway management’s expectations on the field. In the minors, Goodwin has a career .253/.343/.399 slash with a .742 OPS and 53 home runs in 2,399 plate appearances in 565 total games. While those numbers aren’t bad by any means, they don’t “wow” or demonstrate that the Nationals were missing out on a lot. That being said, in Goodwin’s most extended stint in the majors in 2017, he actually impressed, and show glimpses of what he could do with regular playing time.

Filling in for an injured Adam Eaton, Goodwin hit 13 home runs and posted an OPS of .811 in 278 plate appearances in 74 games in 2017. While the average wasn’t great (.251), he made up for it with impressive power, as evidenced by a .498 slugging and .247 ISO last season. It’s easy to see why he was such a heralded prospect in the past when you check out his highlights from 2016 and 2017 in the video below:

Unfortunately, despite the promising extended look last year, Goodwin didn’t get much consistent playing time this year, as he filled in mostly as a pinch hitter with the big league club. He only has appeared in 48 games and has only 79 plate appearances, not much of a sample. And in that small sample, he only hit .200 with a .674 OPS and three home runs.

Goodwin will get a lot of starts and at-bats in the center field position this year, as he will be an upgrade over more free-swinging options such as Herrera, Orlando or even Escobar. The former supplemental-round pick demonstrates a patient approach, as evidenced by a 12.7 percent walk rate this year, and a 36.3 percent swing rate (it was 41 percent last year). To be more effective, he will need to improve his strikeout numbers, as he is striking out in 32.7 percent of his at-bat this year and posted a 24.8 percent K rate a season ago. That being said, considering this club’s problems with free-swinging out of the strike zone, Goodwin’s approach (he has only swung at 22.4 percent of pitches outside the strike zone this year) may be a nice change of pace for this Royals lineup.

Another question will be how Goodwin adapts in the outfield along with Bonifacio and Gordon, who both have their issues defensively. In the outfield, Goodwin was rated as 5.4 runs below average defensively last season in his extended stint, and the fans scouting report from last year wasn’t too glowing either. While Goodwin will have his shot for playing time in the second half, his defense may be the difference in terms of him getting regular playing time, or simply being a fourth outfielder in Kansas City.


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Who did the Royals lose?

The Royals traded relief pitcher Jacob Condra-Bogan, a 32nd round pick in the 2017 MLB Draft who came from Georgia Southern (He was drafted originally by the Toronto Blue Jays). By no means is Condra-Bogan an elite prospect, as he is currently 23-years-old and playing in Lexington (where he is 1.1 years older than the average prospect). But, Condra-Bogan has demonstrated good command in his first full big league season, as evidenced by a 2.08 ERA, 0.77 WHIP, and 39 strikeouts in 26 innings with the Legends.

Condra-Bogan has an interesting backstory, as Maria Torres of the Kansas City star profiled him on June 1st. It’s definitely worth reading if you want to get to know more about the 23-year-old, who bounced around the foster care system growing up. However, while Condra-Bogan definitely is a feel-good player worth rooting for, he didn’t have much of a prospect ceiling as an older, relief-only arm. So it’s not a huge loss overall for the Royals farm system. Nonetheless, Condra-Bogan has his share of fans, as evidenced by the Tweet below:

 


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Why did the Royals make this trade?

I found this Tweet pretty interesting from Down Under Fan (@RoyalDUF), who would have preferred the Royals go with some internal options in Omaha rather than acquiring the Nationals castoff.

In many ways, I empathize with RoyalDUF. The Royals plan ideally should be to rebuild the system by acquiring prospects and finding which players in the system currently are worth keeping and which ones aren’t. That’s not going to happen if players are still playing in Omaha or Northwest Arkansas. Maybe Schwindel or O’Hearn are Four-A players, but the Royals won’t know that unless they get at-bats against MLB players. Acquiring Goodwin definitely impedes that process from happening.

That being said, Goodwin is a low-risk acquisition who has potential to develop with regular playing time in the outfield. After all, he was a former first-round pick, was a highly rated prospect at one point, and has demonstrated that he can produce at the Major League level, as he did last season in Washington. While Condra-Bogan was a nice arm in the system, he was an older prospect in Single-A whose upside was a middle innings relief arm, maybe a setup guy at best. The Royals didn’t have to give up much for Goodwin, so that’s a win for Moore and the Royals organization.

It will be interesting to see too if this is the first of many moves for Moore as we approach the trade deadline. It seems like it’s only a matter of time before Mike Moustakas is gone, and it also seems to be plausible that Whit Merrifield and/or Lucas Duda may be dealt as well (especially Duda, who’s been on a tear in the last couple of games). Thus, the Goodwin trade may be a sign of Moore being proactive, as Goodwin could provide the Royals with some insurance in the lineup once the roster becomes thinner and younger perhaps in the next few weeks.

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Can the Pirates’ Polanco and Cardinals’ Ozuna turn around their fantasy (and team’s) fortunes in the 2nd Half?

The NL Central has certainly seen its share of shakeups this season. After 18 games and a 3-15 start, the Reds fired manager Bryan Price. Even though the club still sits in the cellar of the Central, they have been more competitive as they have posted a record of 40-38 under new manager Jim Riggleman (and Billy Hamilton has increased his fantasy value consequently as well).

The St. Louis Cardinals made a huge move near the end of the first half of the season, firing longtime manager Mike Matheny after a 47-46 start this season. Though the Cardinals were relatively successful in the regular season under Matheny (they never had a losing season and he finished with a winning percentage of .555 in six-and-a-half seasons), the lack of a World Series title, missing the postseason the last two seasons, and rumors that he had lost respect in the clubhouse ultimately led to his relief of duty mid-season.

And lastly, even though the Milwaukee Brewers sat atop the NL Central standings most of the first half, and the Pirates hovered near the bottom part, in the last series before the All-Star break, the Pirates swept the Brew Crew in a FIVE GAME series to knock Milwaukee out of first place, and 2.5 games behind the Chicago Cubs. Consequently, Brewers fans spent the All-Star break in panic mode, fearing deja vu. Last season, they went through a similar swoon in the second half of the year where they went from the top of the standings to out of the playoff picture during the late summer months. Don’t be surprised to see the Brewers an active player at the Trade Deadline in order to prevent the same kind of “burn out” from happening again in 2018. (Though considering the Josh Hader Twitter controversy during the All-Star game, falling out of the playoff race may be the least of Brewer fans’ problems.)

While the AL Central has been pretty much a snoozefest and a showcase of mediocrity (The Cleveland Indians have seemed to be in first place for like…forever), the NL Central has proven to generate its share of excitement, with more drama forecasted over the season’s second half. (I mean, who saw the Cardinals winning 18-5 against Jon Lester in Wrigley Field?)

As the home stretch of the season begins, there will be two outfielders to pay attention to not only for fantasy purposes but also in terms of how they impact the NL Central race in the second half: the Pittsburgh Pirates’ Gregory Polanco and the St. Louis Cardinals’ Marcell Ozuna. Let’s break each player down individually.


MLB: Pittsburgh Pirates at New York Mets

Gregory Polanco, OF, Yahoo! Rank: 113; 73% owned, 60% started in Yahoo! Leagues.

Stats: 49 runs scored, 16 home runs, 51 RBI, 5 SB, .235 average, .823 OPS

Gregory Polanco struggled with injuries a year ago, as he only played 108 games and had 411 plate appearances in 2017. Lingering hamstring issues resulted in deflated numbers across the board: .251 average, .695 OPS, 39 runs scored, 11 home runs, and 35 RBI. (To compare here’s the same line in 2016: .258 average, .786 OPS, 79 runs scored, 22 home runs, 86 RBI in 587 plate appearances). It was questionable which Polanco fantasy baseball and Pirates fans were going to see in 2018: the one that looked like a budding All-Star in 2016 or the one who looked injured and impatient at the plate in 2017.

So far, it’s been a bit of both for Polanco in the first half of the year.

Polanco is showcasing the power again, as his .249 ISO is the highest mark of his career thus far, resulting in 16 home runs before the All-Star break. He is also showing a more discerning eye at the plate as well, as his 12.9 BB percentage would also be a career high as well, and almost double his percentage from a year ago. Without a doubt, it seems like Polanco is fully strong and healthy, and his power numbers certainly demonstrate that and then some.

That being said, it hasn’t been all “sunshine and rainbows” for Polanco in 2018. Despite a tick in power numbers and walk percentages, he still is striking out at a decent clip, as his 23 percent strikeout rate is also a career high. This has resulted in him having a low average at .235, 16 points down from a year ago, and 20 points down from his breakout season of 2016. This may be a result of Polanco maturing as a hitter and becoming more selective: his swing percentage is down at 44 percent, nearly 5 percent down from a year ago. But, even though he is more selective, he hasn’t always made his swings count, as his contact rate is down around 77 percent from 82 percent a year ago, and his swinging strike percentage rose from 8.9 last year to 9.8 so far this year.

Polanco has also benefited from wild stretches of play this season, especially when it comes to power. He hit six home runs in the March and April months and five home runs so far in July, but only hit five combined in June and July. However, while he demonstrated more power in March/April and July, he only hit .195 and .229 (thus far), respectively. On the other hand, though his power numbers were down in the May and June months, he hit better for average, as evidenced by a .306 average in the month of June (his .232 average in May was far less impressive and that month was the stretch where he struggled the most).

The 26-year-old Dominican outfielder has been on a tear as of late, and his hot streak has gotten the Pirates back in the Wild Card mix, even if they remain a long shot (it’s hard to see them doing it considering their starting pitching). A big reason for hope is that the Pirates coaching staff has helped Polanco with his approach, having him step back further in the box before his hot streak so he could get the barrel of his bat around balls quicker. Pittsburgh Tribune writer Chris Adamski in his piece about Polanco highlighted this interesting bit which reveals Polanco’s adjustment in the box:

‘”(Manager Clint Hurdle) called me into the office and he said, ‘Hey you have got to move back from the plate because you have long arms,’ ” Polanco said. “So (Hurdle and the Pirates’ two hitting coaches told Polanco), ‘Just move back and give yourself some space because you are getting jammed, but when you’re back that’s when you hit the ball on the barrel.’…Polanco went from flirting with the Mendoza Line to becoming one of the National League’s best hitters over a span of almost a full month. His .447 on-base percentage and 1.104 OPS since June 10 each rank third among all NL players.”

It will be interesting to see if this small adjustment will continue to help Polanco in the late July, August and September months. He’s a notoriously streaky hitter and he has demonstrated that already in the first half with his vastly different months production-wise. Yes, the power is promising and probably legitimate, but non-existent speed on the basepaths (he only has 5 stolen bases; the days of him being a 20-base threat may be gone), and his declining contact rates should tamper fantasy owners’ and Pirates fans’ excitement for “El Coffee” just a little bit in the second half.


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Marcell Ozuna, OF, Yahoo! Rank: 385; 94% owned, 78% started in Yahoo! Leagues.

Stats: 38 runs scored, 10 home runs, 50 RBI, 2 SB, .270 average, .695 OPS

St. Louis has not been kind to newly acquired outfielders coming to the “Arch” city as of late. After putting up a 128 wRC+ and .276/.393/.447 slash line in the Cubs’ World Series championship season in 2016, Dexter Fowler has declined sharply as a Cardinal, as evidenced by his 56 wRC+ this season.

Unfortunately, the same could be true of Marcell Ozuna, who came over from the Miami Marlins this offseason via trade.

Ozuna was an absolute beast with the Marlins a year ago, lost in the spotlight thanks to a crappy market and larger-than-life superstar in Giancarlo Stanton. Though Stanton garnered more attention (and the bigger contract from the New York Yankees this offseason), Ozuna absolutely tore the cover off the ball in his final season in Miami. In 679 plate appearances, Ozuna hit 37 home runs, drove in 124 RBI, scored 93 runs, hit .312 and posted an OPS of .924. Hence it made sense why Ozuna ranked in the Top-50 in Yahoo! leagues this off-season and considered a second-to-third round draft choice.

But much like Fowler, the performance hasn’t translated on the eastern side of Missouri. Ozuna is down all across the board, and his wRC+ sits at 90, nearly 52 points below his mark last season in South Beach. Though Busch Stadium profiles a bit as a pitcher’s park, so does Marlins Park, which makes Ozuna’s sudden decline concerning for Cardinals fans as well as his fantasy owners.

Now, there are a variety of factors in play that can explain Ozuna’s “down” season in St. Louis. For starters, Ozuna hasn’t always been a high-average hitter, as his batting average each year from 2013-2016 (before his breakout year) was .265, .269, .255, and .266. Not terrible by any stretch, but not the .300 plus mark he demonstrated in 2017. The key reason why it went up so much last year? Well, one could credit that to the BABIP monster, as his BABIP was .355 in 2017, his highest mark as a professional. While his BAIP had been in the .320-.330 range before in his career, the .355 mark probably was more an indicator of luck than skill, as 25-35 points higher than typical is just unsustainable. Currently, his BABIP is .312 which is close to league average and more akin to what he had showcased in the past, hence the dip in average.

On the other hand, the dip in power is a bit more concerning, as he hit 23 home runs in 2014 and 2016 prior to his 37 home run output last year. Having only 10 home runs thus far and an ISO of .115 (which would be a career low) is not typical for him and a serious regression for a hitter who was just starting to fully realize his power stroke a year ago. So…what gives with Ozuna’s lack of punch?

Too many groundballs, and not making his flyballs count.

Ozuna has always hit a lot of groundballs before, as he had a 1.41 GB/FB rate a year ago during his power surge. This year though, not only is he hitting even more groundballs, as evidenced by a 1.51 rate, but his fly balls don’t pack the same punch. Last season, he had an HR/FB of 23.4 percent. This year? That percent is 10.8 percent. That needs to improve if he wants to salvage something at the plate in the second half. On a positive note, Ozuna still hits the ball hard, as his hard-hit balls percentage is actually up at 46.5 percent (it was 39.1 percent a year ago). Thus, it may be a sign that he just needs more luck and see some of those balls to go out of the park rather than stay in the yard or worse, in the gloves of opposing outfielders.

Ozuna doesn’t exactly have the most patient eye (especially in contrast to Polanco), and that has never been more evident this year with his 0.29 BB/K ratio. And yet, other than BB/K ratio and the standard scoring categories, a lot looks the same statistically for Ozuna in comparison to previous years: his plate discipline numbers are close to his career average, and he has actually improved in contact rate and swinging strike percentage. Yes, Ozuna isn’t duplicating his 2017 numbers, but he still has the potential skill-wise to replicate what he did before from 2013-2016 if some breaks go his way in the second half.

Who knows what has been the true reason behind Ozuna’s underwhelming season in the Cardinals red. Overembellished expectations from Cardinals fans and fantasy owners? Not gelling with his new club? Pressing under former manager Matheny? The list could go on and on, really.

But, Ozuna isn’t as mediocre as what he’s showed in the first half. And if he can get back to his normal, average numbers, (especially in power and run production) then well…not only will his fantasy owners be happy, but the Cardinals faithful will also be too. (Not easy to do considering they’re the “best fans in baseball.”)

/vomiting after re-reading the last sentence I just wrote…

What can the Royals do to avoid the most losses in franchise history? (Hint: They have 3 choices…)

The Kansas City Royals ended the “first half” of the 2018 season much like they started: by getting the crap kicked out of them by Chicago White Sox (and I say first half because technically it is beyond “half” numerically, but games before the All-Star Break are officially considered the first half, regardless of the number; confusing I know, but I didn’t create this obviously flawed system). As we enter the All-Star break, the Royals are 27-68 through 95 games, which makes them officially the worst team in baseball going into the Mid-Summer Classic (the Baltimore Orioles surpassed them after a 1-0 win over the Texas Rangers on July 15th, which put their record at 28-69). To make matters worse, not only is this Royals team one of the worst in baseball currently, but they could be the worst Royals team in the 50-year history of the club. (What a great way to celebrate such an anniversary, right?)

The team that currently holds the worst record in Royals history is the 2005 Royals, who went through three managers (Tony Pena, Jr., Bob Schaefer, and Buddy Bell) en route to a 56-106 record. Much like the 2018 Royals, the 2005 squad had just experienced some surprising success a couple of seasons prior. In 2003, the Royals won 83 games, their first winning record in over a decade at the time. (They previously had a winning season in 1993, thanks to the pitching of Kevin Appier. Yes, I know, it sounds weird in retrospect.) Unfortunately, the Royals were unable to build on the “feel good” campaign, fell back to earth in 2004, and went 58-104, the worst mark in franchise history at the time until they topped that loss mark by two games a year later. The horrid two-year stretch had a huge ripple effect throughout the organization, as not only did managers and rosters change dramatically from 2004 through 2005, but the club also parted ways with general manager Allard Baird, and replaced him with current general manager and former Atlanta Braves exec Dayton Moore on the last day of May of 2006.

For many Royals fans, the ghosts of 2004 and 2005 seemed to be a distant memory after such a period of success from 2013-2017. In the five-year stretch, the Royals won 80 games or more each season, made the playoffs and World Series twice (2014 and 2015), and added the second World Series championship in the club’s history to their mantle in 2015 (in addition to their one in 1985 where they beat I-70 rival St. Louis). Yes, the Royals were a small market club. Yes, they didn’t have the payroll of the Yankees, Cubs, Dodgers, or Red Sox. But, it was widely thought that the Royals had set a foundation for various levels of success for years to come.

Oh, how misguided and incorrect Royals fans were.

The poisonous brew of players leaving the club in free agency (Lorenzo Cain and Eric Hosmer), poor free agent signings (Ian Kennedy and Brandon Moss), and a lackluster farm system that had been gutted by mid-season trades (Sean Manaea going to Oakland in the Ben Zobrist Trade) and prospects failing to live up to expectations the past few seasons (Kyle Zimmer and Bubba Starling) has resulted in this season being the nightmare Royals fans were dreading at the conclusion of the 2017 campaign. Not only are the Royals the worst team in baseball now, but they are actually outpacing the 2005 club in losses at this point as well.

By the All-Star break in 2005, the Royals were 30-57 after 87 games (due to the season starting later than this year).

Yep, that’s right: the 2005 team was three wins better than the current Royals by this time of the season (and in 8 fewer games to boot). To make matters worse, for the Royals to tie that putrid 2005 squad, they have to to go 29-38 for the remainder of the season, which means they would have to win at least 43 percent of their remaining 67 games. To compare, in the first half, the Royals only won 28 percent of their 95 games.

To put it lightly, Kylie Jenner winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 would seem like an easier and more plausible task than the Royals tying or surpassing the 2005 Royals’ 56 wins. If the Royals duplicate their win percentage in the second half, they would only go 19-48, which would result in a record of 46-116. So, as you can see, the Royals would have to make up 10 games, just to even tie, which seems like an incredible feat, especially when one considers the trade deadline is July 31st. It is entirely possible there will be one to a few players on the current roster missing come August, hence making the team even weaker down the stretch.

So what should the Royals’ strategy be? What should Moore and manager Ned Yost due to avoid history and the moniker of “Worst Team in Royals History?” Here are a few “strategies” the Royals could take that might have an effect on their fortunes after the All-Star break.


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The Royals could keep playing veterans like Alcides Escobar, and hope they turn it around in the second half.

Strategy #1: Keep the Vets, Play to Win

It seems like a foregone conclusion that the Royals by the trade deadline are going to part ways with Mike Moustakas, and it seems highly likely that they will also part with Lucas Duda and/or Whit Merrifield to help give a contending team an offensive boost down the stretch. And it makes sense. The Royals are going nowhere, and they need to re-stock their farm system, which was ranked near the bottom in the Majors by nearly every publication of note. To trade some established stars for prospect depth at the deadline is a proven strategy that has worked for many clubs in years past (the Oakland A’s are masters of this approach).

But, teams these days value their prospects more than ever, and it is possible that the Royals may not get much in return for some of their current players. After all, Moustakas didn’t field much interest in free agency last off-season (hence him still being on the Royals), and while he’s having a solid season (19 home runs, 58 RBI, .250 average, and a .775 OPS), he has been overshadowed by Manny Machado when it comes to trade talks. Duda is a big bat, but he’s going through a down season at the plate and is a defensive liability, making him useless on a National League team. And while Merrifield offers position versatility and is a threat with the bat and on the basepaths, he won’t be a free agent until 2023, and he’ll be turning 30 next year, not an age where players of his skill set typically get better.

So with that being known, Moore may say “screw it” to all offers and just let it ride on the vets, and hope that they can stay healthy and turn around this season. The positive? Well, the Royals certainly would have a better chance to win with Merrifield and Moustakas and Duda in the lineup for the rest of the 2018 season as they have shown glimpses of success this year and in previous seasons. The negative? The veteran strategy would also employ vets such as Alcides Escobar, who has a negative-1.8 WAR, the worst mark on the team, as well as Kennedy and Jason Hammel in the rotation, who each have a 5.13 and 6.15 ERA, respectively.

Yost is a loyal, player-friendly manager, and if given the chance, he would trot Moustakas, Merrifield, Duda, and Escobar in the infield every day until the last game of the season, regardless of their performance. So the decision to employ or not employ this strategy would rest on Moore, who would need to trade at least one of these vets to take the lineup card out of Yost’s hands.


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Youngsters like Jorge Bonifacio (center) playing with veterans like Whit Merrifield (left) and Mike Moustakas could be a recipe for success.

Strategy #2: Play the youngsters, but in the right spots

We’re starting to see this strategy a bit in July, as Yost has started to depend on Adalberto Mondesi at SS rather than Escobar. (Though I do not get why he’s playing Escobar out of position in the outfield; he’s the worst hitter on the team…why is he continuing to play?) He’s also been giving Hunter Dozier, and Jorge Bonifacio at-bats as well, a sign that the organization wants to start seeing which “prospects” will have a future with the big league club, and which ones will be traded or triple-A fodder in the next couple of years.

But, going all out on the youngsters carries some risk. Some of the young players have responded, such as Mondesi, who has finished the first half with a .714 OPS. Some still leave a lot to be desired, like Dozier, who was touted as a strong-hitting, corner infielder, but is only hitting .211 with a .604 OPS and has negative-1.0 WAR, the second-worst mark on the team. So, it would be wise to balance out lineups with young guns and veterans on a day to day or series to series basis.

Want to start Mondesi, Dozier, and perhaps Cheslor Cuthbert, when he comes back from the DL (or perhaps Nicky Lopez, who may get called up from Omaha soon), in the infield? Well, make sure Merrifield is in the lineup to stabilize things. The same strategy applies to the outfield. Going with Bonifacio and Rosell Herrera? Then Gordo will be the left fielder to provide veteran mentorship to the lineup as well as in the field. The same works in the rotation, as Danny Duffy could be a veteran mentor for young starters like Brad Keller and Trevor Oaks (who should get called up again sometime in the second half).

The strategy carries a little more risk, since many of the young players on this roster are pretty unproven, and as stated before, they come from a system that isn’t highly regarded by any means. That being said, these lineups offer a little more upside than a “veteran only” strategy, and could also provide some hope for the future for Royals fans.


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The Royals could go all in on their prospects at the big league level, like Adalberto Mondesi at SS.

Strategy #3: Go all in on youth…regardless of the result

The Royals could do the equivalent of the “blow it up” NBA model. Moore and Yost could say “You know what? Screw the veterans! Who cares if they won us a title in 2015! Let’s rebuild now!” Escobar? Now a benchwarmer. Duda and Gordon? Spot starters. Hell, even give Salvador Perez a couple of days more off than usual so we can see what Cam Gallagher can do.

The strategy works in two ways:

  1. The young players get at-bats and experience, and if there’s anything that makes a younger player better at the Major League level, it’s more at-bats and experience. (It’s just common sense, but it’s amazing how some fans don’t understand this basic concept of “more experience = better development; less experience = less development.”)
  2. And if the young players suck, well, the Royals get a high first-round pick, and they know for sure who to build around for the future, and who not to sooner rather than later. When employing strategy #2, the problem is teams can get hung up on players longer than they want because the player is not getting enough at-bats to make a definitive decision. However, if you give 400-500 at-bats to a young player in a season, and he is clearly bad, well…it’s easier to cut ties because that is a pretty large sample size.

So there are some strong benefits to the “go young and let it ride” approach. Nonetheless, it’s a strategy that also carries a ton of risk (definitely the most of the three) and could alienate the fanbase more than the box office would like (i.e. it could kill ticket sales; the Royals still rank 11 out of 15 in the AL in attendance, which is a lot better than the 2005 squad). While the Royals need to rebuild and start looking to the future, the typical Royals fan wants to see faces he or she remembers from the 2015 team. So that means seeing Gordo, and Salvy, and Escobar for better or worse. Maybe they’re not the same players they were three seasons ago, but at least seeing their faces brings up good memories and nostalgia over copious amounts of Miller Lite in the bleacher seats.

And fans buying more Miller Lite is good for business at Kauffman stadium.


royals-aim-for-series-win-over-white-sox-before-break
Manager Ned Yost will have to make some interesting decisions to help turn around this club in the second half.

What strategy is the best for the Royals?

Personally, from an economic standpoint, number two is obviously the most logical. There are some players worth playing and keeping on this roster. Gordon deserves to play as long as he wants as a Royal (he’s earned it by helping them win a title and has been loyal to the organization through thick and thin), and Merrifield is a gritty player who provides a spark to this club and probably wouldn’t get what he’s worth on the trade market. But, there are a lot of veterans who need to go. As unexpectedly great as Moustakas has been this year, his value will never be higher, and the Royals need to get something in return to help stock their Royals system (after all, they received three prospects for Kelvin Herrera; I’m sure the Royals can get more for Moose). Escobar’s defense and timely hitting was appreciated in the 2014 and 2015 playoff runs, but his time as a serviceable MLB player is up and Mondesi deserves his shot. And while Duda brings a veteran bat to the lineup, I would rather see Dozier get a full shot at the position to see if he can be a big-league player, or if he’s simply a “four-A” prospect.

Overall, it’s likely the Royals will probably employ an overall #2 strategy as well. (I mean, really, how could you not? It’s the most practical strategy.) But the big question will be this: Will Moore and Yost’s strategy be closer to #1 or closer to #3? Will they still be loyal to the vets? Or will they ride their fortunes a little more on the young guns, with “low-key” hopes to secure the No. 1 pick if those youngsters don’t pan out?

I think Royals fans will have a good idea of their choice in strategy come August 1st.